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INTERSECTIONALITY, LIFE EXPERIENCE &
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING:
A NEW VIEW OF GENDER AT THE SUPREME COURT
ANGELA NICOLE JOHNSON*
On New Year’s Day, acting at the request of an order of Catholic
nuns in Colorado, Justice Sotomayor temporarily blocked the Obama
administration, acting under the Affordable Care Act, from requiring
some religiously affiliated groups to provide health insurance coverage
of birth control.1  In response, commentators attacked the Justice and
blamed her decision—one viewed as betraying President Obama and
women’s rights—on the fact that Sotomayor is Catholic.2  Many schol-
ars and judges have said that the presence of women in the judiciary
affects overall judicial decision making.3  Scholars proclaim that female
judges vote with a “woman’s voice.”  While some judges would agree,
others argue, “[a] wise old man and a wise old woman [will] reach the
same conclusion.”4  Existing studies finding a gendered correlation
focus only on the sex of the decision maker while ignoring the exper-
iences of the individual judge.  Because these studies tally-up the num-
ber of female votes versus male, if any correlation is found, the
conclusion is drawn at the outset—that gender alone causes an impact.
This Note acknowledges the statistically significant correlation of gen-
der on decision making in certain kinds of cases, but argues the rela-
tionship is more nuanced.  Instead of focusing on the impact of gender
as a biologically immutable factor, the correlation is actually a result of
individual experience.  Although women may generally share certain
kinds of experiences, such as gender discrimination, studies concluding
that gender is the determinative factor miss the mark and contribute to
a misalignment of scholarly focus.  I advocate instead for a more holistic
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; B.A., Indiana University South
Bend, 2011.  Many thanks to Dr. Elizabeth Bennion for her ongoing mentorship and
invaluable feedback on this Note.
1. Steve Kenny & Robert Pear, Justice Blocks Contraception Mandate on Insurance in Suit
by Nuns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/us/politics/
justice-sotomayor-blocks-contraception-mandate-in-health-law.html?_r=0.
2. Jamie Stiehm, The Catholic Supreme Court’s War on Women, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/jamie-stiehm/2014/01/
07/the-catholic-supreme-courts-war-on-women (“[No] mercy for women on the Supreme
Court, not even from a woman”).
3. See infra, Part II.A.
4. David Margolick, Women’s Milestone: Majority on Minnesota Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 1991, at B16 (citing Justice Jeanne Coyne).  Although Justice O’Connor is often
credited as the mantra’s original author, it was actually Justice Jeanne Coyne, formerly of
the Minnesota Supreme Court who said, “a wise old man and a wise old woman reach the
same conclusion.  In the vast majority of cases, [gender] will have no impact whatever.”
Former and current Supreme Court justices disagree with this adage. See infra note 139
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analysis based on experiential factors, rather than merely a compartmen-
talized analysis of gender.  This approach highlights broader public pol-
icy implications and advances support for judicial diversity.
This Note examines previous research focused on gendered deci-
sion making at the federal appellate courts and applies it to the U.S.
Supreme Court and particularly, the Roberts Court.  Past studies on
gender involving a large sample size, although statistically sound, fail to
focus on the individual experience that informs judicial decision mak-
ing.  Given the large sample size of past studies, it is impractical to bio-
graphically evaluate each judge to determine whether personal
experience, not merely gender, impacts decision making.  However the
impact of experience is highlighted by applying statistical studies examin-
ing intermediate appellate courts to the individual Justices at the
Supreme Court.  Moreover, examining the experiences commonly
shared by one group, such as women, permits an appreciation of the
broader implications of experience on judges generally.   Conversely,
compartmentalizing women judges as having a “woman’s voice” works
against advancing judicial diversity, as women judges are then more
likely to be placed on the court as token appointments.5  Once a slot is
filled, future appointments are less likely.  As noted in scholarship on
gender in politics, “[d]ifferences among men, and differences among
women, remind us that gender is not an overriding or monolithic force
differentiating the attitudes (and behavior) of women and men in pub-
lic office.”6  Even if the members of the U.S. Supreme Court repre-
sented the demographic cross-section of society, the Court would still
not be reflective of the diverse possible experiences that inform deci-
sion making.  Therefore, scholarship in the area of gender and judicial
decision making should refocus on the experiences of the individual
judge, and not solely on any one isolated cause and effect.
In support of my argument that each Justice contributes their own
unique experiences to the court, I compare the role of experiences,
which may be (but not necessarily) shared by women, to the role of
Chief Justice.  Adding a mutable variable unrelated to gender illustrates
how we might better think of the role of women and judging: no two
Chief Justices, just as no two women, will fulfill their duties in the same
manner.  A broader analysis of the role of experience is complicated
because experience manifests itself in many ways.  Because each judge
brings a unique viewpoint to the bench, she may feel a moral or ethical
obligation to share her experiences to help inform the decision making
of others.  By sharing her viewpoint, the individual’s experiences also
impact the decision making of her colleagues.  This occurs in any scena-
5. One study found that when women comprise less than fifteen percent of an
organization, women adhere to organizational norms to avoid stereotypes, resulting in
the dominant institutional norm prevailing.  In other words, the addition of too few
“token” appointments will result in a failure to diversify the overall “voice” of the institu-
tion. ELIZABETH A. BENNION, GENDER, PERCEPTION, AND POLICY PRIORITIES IN THREE MID-
WESTERN STATE LEGISLATURES (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-
Madison) (on file with author).
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rio, regardless of gender, and is a natural tendency in any human
interaction.
Although well-intentioned scholarship has pushed for more
women in the judiciary on the basis that they have a different voice,
focusing on experience more effectively advances arguments for diver-
sity.  Achieving a diverse judiciary—one comprised of representative
experiences felt by the entire populace—is as a matter of public policy,
key to strengthening public support, trust, and legitimacy in the judici-
ary.  Any experience, whether triggered by gender, race, social back-
ground, or an intersection of many causes, is combined with other views
held by each individual Justice, including political ideology and mode
of constitutional interpretation.  These variables comprise the individ-
ual and at times compete with one another or take precedence.  A com-
prehensive examination of all experiential factors is beyond the scope
of this paper.  However, as with gender, it is erroneous to focus on a
compartmentalized label of “race” or “religion” while dismissing the
impact of experience.  Instead, these characteristics collectively work,
along with agents of socialization, education, occupation, etc., to shape
one’s life experiences and inform decision making.
Part I explains the allure of judicial decision making.  Part II exam-
ines existing scholarship demonstrating a correlation between judicial
decision making and gender.  Part III applies recent scholarship, which
focuses on the federal appellate courts to the U.S. Supreme Court.  To
better understand how experience informs judicial decision making, I
address the experiences related to gender felt by women who have
served and are now serving on the Supreme Court.  Part IV compares
the impact of gender, based on experiences commonly felt by women,
to the non-gender-specific role of the Chief Justice and how a Chief
Justice contributes his own experiences for the benefit of others.  Part V
briefly draws comparisons to other experiential factors, including race,
religion, and socioeconomic status.  Part VI ponders the consequence
of experience on the broader concerns of morality, ethics, and public
policy in judicial diversity.
I. THE MYSTIQUE OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
Insight into judicial decision making, especially that of United
States Supreme Court Justices, is in high demand yet difficult to
obtain.7  The law and those who are involved in it yearn for predictabil-
ity, which would drive, as well as stabilize, our legal system.  With
emphasis on precedent and stare decisis, legal scholars, litigants, and
engaged citizens seek certainty of the future of our legal system based
on what has already been decided, coupled with the tendency of any
justice to vote in a particular way.  Critics argue the Court is too secre-
tive, that “[i]n the third and least covered branch of government,
7. See Matt Negrin, Roberts’ Switch on Health Care Signals a Leaky Supreme Court, ABC
NEWS (July 2, 2012) http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/chief-justice-john-robertss-
switch-obamacare-health-care/story?id=16698557 (“Candor and insight into a Supreme
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secrecy is a hallmark.”8  This fuels a desire to predict future decision
making by compartmentalizing any particular justice as “liberal” or
“conservative” and even as “woman.”
In pursuit of certainty, judicial nominees are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny throughout the appointment process.  Lifetime judicial
appointments are among the greatest and longest lasting legacies of any
presidency, and every appointment is political.  Merit competes with
other considerations, like personal and ideological compatibility, inter-
woven with the support and opposition forces in Congress and the
White House.9  Appointing a Justice is not a small undertaking.10
Arguably, this is a lot of (needless) work when predictability may not
“carry the day.”  Due to the misconception that one can adequately pre-
dict future decision making based on compartmentalized labels, many
are shocked when a judge labeled as “liberal” or “conservative” votes
contrary to expectations.11  Alternatively, if greater emphasis ought to
be given to each potential nominee’s individual life experiences,
exhaustive professional and personal investigations with Senate Judici-
ary Committee grilling are justified to unearth more information.  This
is impractical and serves to deter otherwise qualified candidates.  Thus,
using labels such as “liberal” and “conservative,” or “man” and “woman”
are viewed as more convenient—even if having a false sense of certainty
may bring reassurance at the cost of accuracy.
II. EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP ON GENDER AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
A. Gender Discrimination Cases at the U.S. Courts of Appeal
Research has “shown that female judges tend to be the strongest
supporters of women’s rights claims, regardless of their ideology.”12  Of
thirty studies, approximately one-third found a correlation between a
judge’s gender and the decisions they reach.13  Others find a correla-
tion only in certain types of cases.  For instance, even though plaintiffs
lost in the vast majority of sexual harassment or gender discrimination
8. Id.  But see SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 24 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003) (arguing the federal judiciary is the
least secretive branch because it is the only one that publishes its opinions for everyone to
see).
9. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 34
(8th ed. 2008).
10. Id. at 41 (detailing the investigatory process of advisors and the FBI).
11. Like other presidents, President Truman experienced disappointment in his
judicial appointments. He once said, “Whenever you put a man on the Supreme Court he
ceases to be your friend.  I’m sure of that.”  He felt he had misjudged his appointee: “He
hasn’t made one right decision that I can think of . . . .” Id. at 87. See also Negrin, supra
note 7 (discussing Justice Robert’s vote with the “liberal” justices to uphold the Affordable
Care Act).
12. Barbara Palmer, “To Do Justly”: The Integration of Women into the American Judici-
ary, 34 POL. SCI. & POL. 235, 237 (2001) (citations omitted).
13. Deborah Rhode, In a “Different” Voice: What Does the Research About How Gender
Influences Judging Actually Say?, SLATE (June 10, 2009), http://www.slate.com/id/
2220220/ (citing Christina Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, paper
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appeals, they were nearly twice as likely to prevail with a female judge
on the appellate panel.14  Variations among studies are attributable to
the low sample size upon which to study.15  Additionally, each study
differs in time period, controlling law, types of cases decided, and juris-
diction.  Ideology also poses a challenge because it is hard to control as
a variable.  For instance, women on the federal bench lean to the politi-
cal left while men are more evenly distributed.16  Judges appointed by
Democratic presidents found for gender discrimination plaintiffs more
than Republican appointees, though Republican-appointed female
judges supported plaintiffs at about the same rate as Democratic-
appointed males (twenty-nine and thirty percent respectively).17
Republican-appointed female judges are more likely than Republican-
appointed male judges to vote pro-plaintiff in gender discrimination
cases.18  For scholars, this fact is the key in demonstrating that gen-
der—not just party affiliation—plays a part in decision making.  As I
argue in Part III however, by comparing these studies to the voting
behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, it is apparent that while gen-
der and party affiliation affect decision making, it is not gender itself
that matters, it is gendered experience.
The disclosure of an experience can even influence a colleague’s
decision making.  For instance, male judges’ voting behavior changes
when a female is added to an appellate panel.  The presence of a
female judge “more than doubled the probability that a male judge
ruled for the plaintiff in sexual harassment cases (increasing the
probability from sixteen percent to thirty-five percent) and nearly trip-
led this probability in sex discrimination cases (increasing [the odds]
from eleven percent to thirty percent).”19  Further, the presence of a
female judge affects males regardless of party affiliation.20  More
reserved figures still nevertheless report a significant impact.  Another
study found when a woman is on the appellate panel, the likelihood
that a male colleague will rule in favor of the plaintiff increased
14. Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1776 (2005) (demonstrating that pro-
plaintiff decisions increased from twenty-two percent to forty-one percent in sex harass-
ment cases and from seventeen percent to twenty-eight percent in gender discrimination
cases).
15. See 2013 Representation of United States State Court Women Judges, NAT’L ASS’N OF
WOMEN JUDGES, http://www.nawj.org/us_state_court_statistics_2013.asp (women com-
prise thirty-five percent of state final appellate jurisdiction judges and thirty-three percent
of intermediate appellate jurisdiction judges); see also Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a
Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENTER (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.nwlc.org/
resource/women-federal-judiciary-still-long-way-go-1 (thirty-two percent of active judges
currently sitting on the thirteen federal courts of appeal are female).
16. Rhode, supra note 13. R
17. Peresie, supra note 14, at 1776–77 (study examined three-judge federal appel- R
late panels deciding cases involving female claimants alleging sexual harassment or gen-
der discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; importantly, the
study controlled for possible variables by limiting the time period studied to a timeframe
with no significant changes in Supreme Court precedent or federal statutes).
18. Id.
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between twelve and sixteen percent.21  Thus, even statistically conserva-
tive studies provide strong evidence that the presence of a female judge
affects the decision making of her male colleagues.  Section C explores
competing explanations for this gendered correlation.  However, a
woman’s influence might be limited.  One study found only the pres-
ence of the first woman on the appellate panel affected the probability
that a male judge ruled for the plaintiff; the addition of a second
female did not significantly impact the likelihood of rendering a pro-
plaintiff decision.22
B. Gender Discrimination is a Unique Experience Shared Among
Women Judges
To demonstrate how experience, and not merely gender, affects judi-
cial decision making, particularly with respect to gender discrimination
cases, this Section presents a brief history of women (and discrimina-
tion against women) in the legal profession.
Women entered the legal profession very slowly.  In 1868, three
women were the first to apply for admission to law school, making
Columbia University the first of many to deny women applicants.23
Esther McQuigg Morris became the first woman judge in the United
States when she was appointed as the justice of the peace in South Pass
City, Wyoming in 1870.24  Myra Bradwell unsuccessfully argued to the
United States Supreme Court in 1873 that the Fourteenth Amendment
protected her right to obtain a license to practice law.25  By 1920, only
fifteen women had been appointed or elected to even minor judicial
roles.26  When practicing female attorney Alta Hulett passed away at the
age of twenty-three, newspapers considered this “proof” that women
should stay away from the stresses of the legal profession.27  That theory
was advanced when Livinia Goodell died at the age of forty-one, just
one year after successfully battling the Wisconsin Supreme Court for
her law license.28
Women continued to gain access to the legal profession and used
their skills to further women’s participation as lawyers.  Burnita Shelton
21. Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging (2008)
(paper presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association).
22. Peresie, supra note 14, at 1782. But see BENNION, supra note 5, at 14 (diversity’s R
effect is felt only once women comprise at least fifteen percent of participants).
23. Angela Nicole Johnson, A Timeline of Women’s History in the Legal Profession,
RESEARCHING WOMEN AS LAWYERS, http://womenaslawyers.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/
a-timeline-of-womens-history-in-the-legal-profession-last-updated-6-20-11.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2014) (citing HEDDA GARZA, BARRED FROM THE BAR: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1996)).
24. Id. Judge Morris was no doubt, the first to fine her husband for entering her
courtroom in a ruckus over her new job; when he refused to pay, she packed him off to
jail.
25. Id. (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)).
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Matthews became the first woman to serve on a federal district court in
1950.29  That same year, Harvard Law School opened its doors to
women for the first time.30  The Women’s Rights Law Reporter, a journal
of legal scholarship focusing exclusively on women’s rights law, was
founded by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1970.31 Title IX of the Higher
Education Act, which prohibits discrimination based on sex in the
enrollment of students and hiring of faculty, was enacted in 1972.32  In
response, law schools began to admit more women to their classes.33  By
1977, only eight women had served in the federal judiciary.34  Sandra
Day O’Connor became the first woman to serve on the United States
Supreme Court in 1981.35  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, after promoting
women’s advancement in the legal profession, became the second
female Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993.36  Three women
currently serve on the U.S. Supreme Court—the largest number in
history.
Despite some high profile women in top law firms and judicial
offices, recent numbers show only nominal improvement.  Full-time
women lawyers are paid a salary of seventy-seven percent of their male
counterparts.37  Women comprise thirty-three percent of all lawyers (a
four percent increase over a decade),38 forty-five percent of associates
yet only nineteen percent of partners,39 forty-six percent of law students
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing SUSAN EHRLICH MARTIN & NANCY C. JURIK, DOING JUSTICE, DOING GEN-
DER 110 (2007)).
31. Id.  Sex-Based Discrimination, the first law school casebook addressing the topic,
was coauthored by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1974.
32. Id.
33. Two years later, women’s representation among American law students
increased from nine percent to twenty. See First Year and Total J.D. Enrollment by Gender
1947-2011, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administra-
tive/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/jd_enrollment_1yr_total_
gender.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
34. Johnson, supra note 23 (citing MARTIN & JURIK, supra note 30); see also Mary L. R
Clark, Carter’s Groundbreaking Appointment of Women to the Federal Bench: His Other “Human
Rights” Record, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1131 (2003) (describing President
Carter’s commitment to appointing women to Article III judgeships).
35. Johnson, supra note 23. R
36. Id.
37. See Median Weekly Earnings of Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers by Detailed Occupa-
tion and Sex, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS., www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf (statistics for 2012)
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014).  Other studies indicate after only two to three years of practice,
the average full-time woman earned 5.2% less than her male counterpart; at seven years,
the difference increased to approximately 13%.  Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman,
Navigating the Gap: Reflections on 20 Years Researching Gender Disparity, 8 FIU L. REV. 515,
531 (2013); see also Laurel Bellows, Gender Inequity in Pay Diminishes Women’s Prospects–and
the Law Profession, ABA JOURNAL (June 1, 2013, 4:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/gender_inequity_in_pay_diminishes_womens_prospectsand_the_law_
profession/ (“Female equity partners in the 200 largest firms, who do comparable work to
men, earn 89 percent of the compensation of their male peers.”).
38. A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN
THE LAW 2 (2013).
39. Id.  See also Sterling & Recihman, supra note 37, at 516 (In 2010, 2011, and 2012,
women made up 19.43%, 19.54% and 19.91% of all partners; these figures are not com-
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(a four percent decrease from ten years prior),40 thirty-four percent of
tenured law faculty,41 thirty percent of federal district court judges, and
thirty-two percent of federal circuit court judges.42  There are a dozen
district courts where no woman has ever served, and the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits each have just one woman serving.43
Women in the legal profession still have a long way to go to achieve
equality.  Women might first sense an imbalance in law school44 and
later face discrimination in pay45 and advancement to partnership posi-
tions.46  Because so many women in the legal profession have exper-
ienced gender discrimination, for many women judges, the issue is
familiar.  Even for those not personally affected by discrimination, wit-
nessing the hardships placed upon women in the judiciary has a psycho-
logical component—she need only look to her colleagues to see the
disparity.47  Thus, when a female judge is called on to decide a case
involving gender discrimination, she is asked to decide an issue that has
affected her personally.  She has experienced gender-based discrimina-
tion, witnessed such discrimination, or at the very least, is aware of the
history of discrimination in the profession.  Unsurprisingly, the deci-
sion making impact of women judges is clearest in gender discrimina-
tion cases.
C. Competing Explanations for Gendered Correlation
There are various explanations for why the presence of a woman
on a three-judge appellate panel affects her male colleagues’ decision
making.  First, the impact may simply be felt as a gender-neutral conse-
quence of judicial politics within a panel.48  As demonstrated in Part IV,
this phenomenon exists in many contexts, regardless of the nature of
the case or gender of the judge, and occurs particularly when a Chief
Justice seeks unanimity or collegiality.  Second, male judges may defer
40. Id.
41. 2008-2009 AALS Statistical Report on Law Faculty, AM. ASS’N L. SCHS., http://www.
aals.org/statistics/2009far/gender.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (representing a nine
percent increase from 2002).
42. NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENTER, supra note 15. R
43. Id.
44. Although women comprise a near-equal number of law students and law jour-
nal members, they represent only 28.6% of editors in chief. Ms. JD, Women on Law Review:
A Gender Diversity Report, 2012, available at http://ms-jd.org/files/lr2012_final.pdf.  Addi-
tionally, women law students may perceive a gender bias in comparing the percentage of
those employed in more prestigious positions within their law school. For instance,
women comprise 66.2% of assistant deans but only 20.6% of deans are women; 53.4% of
assistant professors are women while only 29.9% of full professorships are awarded to
women; age statistics indicate a gender disparity even when accounting for women’s
delayed equality in the number of law school graduates. ASS’N AM. L. SCHS, 2008-2009
Statistical Report on Law School Faculty, available at http://www.aals.org/statistics/2009dlt/
titles.html.
45. See generally supra note 37.
46. See generally supra note 39.
47. Id. (only one in three judges are female).
48. FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLE-
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to their female colleagues without deeply considering the information
given, thereby voting by proxy.  Here, a moderating effect occurs: a
male judge silences himself out of respect for his female colleagues or
fear of appearing biased—even sexist—if he opposes the female plain-
tiff’s claims.49  The surface factor of gender drives decision making.
Third, male judges may seek input from a female colleague based on
her viewpoint or past experiences but not based on gender.  In this
instance, the judge internalizes that information with his own under-
standing.  Similar dialogues could occur among judges regardless of
gender.  The information gained is more likely to have a long-term
impact because the judge has gained information from a colleague
whose experience he or she has not had.  The impact is lasting because
it is personal and emotional as opposed to words on the page of a pol-
ished brief.  And in adverse litigation, the personal experience of a neu-
tral party (as opposed to the plaintiff) is assigned added value.  Indeed,
one study demonstrated the long-term benefits of having a female
judge on an appellate panel in sexual harassment cases: male judges
who served on the female-integrated panel were thirty-three percent
more likely to render a pro-plaintiff decision in future sexual harass-
ment cases even if no female judge was serving on the panel.50
This third explanation is most desirable because the impact contin-
ues and might apply in various cases involving other experiential fac-
tors.  The premise is broad: one colleague expects insight on certain
issues based on another’s experiences, whether shaped by gender, race,
age, social status, etc.  Of course, gender discrimination cases are
among those affected by the presence of a woman decision maker
because it is an experience commonly shared by women that may
inform their legal reasoning.  Although such shared experiences
include a statistically higher risk of experiencing domestic violence and
sexual assault, to date no study has explored a correlation of judicial
decision making.  Nevertheless, the broad applicability and long-term
effects serve to emphasize the value of a diverse judiciary.
It is baseless to suggest that women are inherently more pro-plain-
tiff in gender discrimination cases (or any case) on the basis that they
are more empathetic or kind than their male colleagues.  Eliminating
gender discrimination from the equation and replacing it with gender-
49. For example, one study found that U.S. Supreme Court Justices were more
likely to side with female attorneys who presented oral argument in women’s rights cases
(sex discrimination and harassment, reproductive rights, materiality rights, and issues
involving equal employment opportunity), no matter which ideological position the woman
attorney happens to be advocating in the case.
This is likely a reflection of the influence of a gender stereotype that women
lawyers are more capable of addressing these issues.  In essence, gender acts as a
heuristic for substantive legal expertise in these cases.  As such, the Justices
attach more credibility to the information presented by woman attorneys in
these cases, and are therefore more likely to side with them.
John J. Szmer et al., Have We Come a Long Way, Baby? The Influence of Attorney Gender on
Supreme Court Decision Making, 6 POL. & GENDER 1, 29 (2010).
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neutral subjects such as criminal sentencing51 and securities law52 fur-
ther supports this assertion and highlights the importance of experien-
tial factors, rather than gender.  Women, as a compartmentalized
group, are not affected by securities law or crime in the same way
women commonly experience gender discrimination.
Studying gender without examining the individual experiences of
each decision maker is inherently problematic because it commands
the conclusion that gender alone influences decision making.  Once
the inquiry’s focus is broadened beyond gender, coupled with an
understanding of the history of gender discrimination in the legal pro-
fession, it is apparent that the correlation between gender and judicial
decision making in gender discrimination cases is that women, as part
of their varied experiences, are more likely than men to have exper-
ienced gender discrimination firsthand.53  Since men are less likely to
experience gender discrimination personally, they lack the essential
experiential factor that could influence their decision making but are
nevertheless capable of understanding gender discrimination.  It is not,
as antiquated scholarship suggests, that women are biologically more
empathetic or more likely to decide cases more favorably in perceivably
traditional women’s issues, but rather, it is experience that matters.
Instead, learning about gender discrimination from someone who
experienced it, assuming the male listens empathetically, may lead him
to draw upon that experience to inform his decision making as if he
had experienced it himself.54  Expansively, any diverse experience can
be shared to affect the decision making of others.
51. Contrary to the misconception that women judges are more empathetic or nur-
turing, they “are somewhat harsher (i.e., more likely to incarcerate and impose longer
sentences) . . . .”  Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does
the Judge’s Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 J. SOC. FORCES 1163, 1163
(1999); but see Jerry Goldman & Kent E. Portney, The Role of Gender in Determining the
Criminal Sanction: Results from Multimedia Experiments in Criminal Sentencing, Presentation at
the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 1997,
Washington, D.C., available at http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/faculty/portney/gender.pdf
(finding female judges are more lenient on female armed robbery defendants; however,
there were no statistically significant gender effects on other cases studied).
52. See Lyman Johnson et al., Gender and Securities Law in the Supreme Court, 33
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 2 (2011) (a study of U.S. Supreme Court cases decided between
1971-2010 involving securities law issues revealed no discernible gender impact though
unanimous verdicts were reached more frequently with female-integrated panels, sug-
gesting that female Justices induce collaboration in the deliberation process).
53. Alternatively, this may be attributable to “gender consciousness.”  Gender con-
sciousness, as a cognitive framework or schema, influences the way that people “see” the
world.  For instance, those who strongly identify as feminists (or anti-feminists) seem to be
thinking in gender-schematic ways. BENNION, supra note 5, at 153. R
54. Maya Sen, Courting Deliberation: An essay on Deliberative Democracy in the American
Judicial System, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303, 307 (2013) (“those embark-
ing on a deliberative enterprise must be willing to consider seriously opposing viewpoints
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III. THE IMPACT OF GENDER AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AT THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT
A. Applying Existing Findings to the U.S. Supreme Court
Although “diversity” should not be constrained to traditional fac-
tors like race and gender, it is true that in this sense, the Roberts Court
is the most diverse ever, with an African American, two Italian Ameri-
cans, its first Latina (and first non-native English-speaking Justice), and
three women now serving.  They each have varied paths to the bench.
Following Justice O’Connor’s departure and before Justice Kagan’s
appointment, all serving Supreme Court justices had prior federal
appellate judicial experience.55  The Roberts Court therefore, provides
an unprecedented opportunity for examination of the effects of both
traditional diversity—based on race, gender, religion—and experiential
diversity on judicial decision making.
Any sort of statistical inquiry into the Supreme Court is inherently
problematic given its small number of Justices and few opinions ren-
dered.  Similarly, studying federal appellate courts skews results point-
ing to the category of gender without examining experience.  Existing
studies focusing on the courts of appeals produce statistically significant
results; however, an examination of the Supreme Court provides an ele-
ment lacking in the courts of appeals studies: more is known about each
Justice’s individual experiences.  With a smaller sample size, it becomes
practical to examine individual cases and decision makers.  This facili-
tates pointing more clearly to experience and not simply gender.
Experience especially drives decision making when judges are
deciding cases without a clear doctrinal background or when political
ideology does not provide a default.56  Then, Justices’ own experiences,
whether informed by race, gender, socioeconomic, or prior judicial
experience, play an important and distinct role in decision making.
Similarly, a Justice’s own experiences come to bear in applying legal
standards involving subjective elements, such as whether a thirteen-
year-old girl perceived her strip search by school officials as an invasion
of privacy (determined by “both subjective and reasonable societal
expectations of personal privacy”).57  As demonstrated in prior studies
of the federal courts of appeal, decisions dealing with gender discrimi-
nation provide another example where, regardless of ideology, per-
sonal experiences inform judicial decision making.
Akin to the studies of intermediate appellate panels, female U.S.
Supreme Court Justices also share their experiences to inform their
male colleagues’ decision making.  Justice Rehnquist provided just one
55. Tracey E. George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the Supreme
Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1334–40 (2008).
56. Some have argued that this occurred in the 2013 decision upholding the
Affordable Care Act. See Sabrina Siddiqui, John Roberts’ Switch on Obamacare Sparks Fascina-
tion with Supreme Court, Possible Leaks, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2012), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2012/07/02/justice-roberts-obamacare-supreme-court-leaks_n_16448
64.html.
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example of this external impact.  He once said “sex discrimination
claims carry little weight”58 and even mocked then-litigator Ruth Bader
Ginsburg at the end of her oral argument before the Court: “You won’t
settle for putting Susan B. Anthony on the new dollar, right?”59  Yet
later as Chief Justice, he wrote the six to three majority opinion in
Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs,60 holding that the Family Med-
ical Leave Act is a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity, justified
by a history of persistent unconstitutional discrimination of female and
male workers.  Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, “[W]hen women are
stereotyped as responsible for the domestic sphere, and men are not,
that makes women seem less valuable as employees.”61  Justice Ginsburg
reflected on whether the presence of female colleagues shaped Rehn-
quist’s views: “I think I would attribute it to his court experience and his
life experience . . . . When his daughter Janet was divorced, I think the
chief felt some kind of responsibility to be kind of a father figure to
those girls.  So he became more sensitive to things that he might not
have noticed.”62  Demonstrably, the ability for gendered enlightenment
does not discriminate among sexes.  Because these experiential factors
are often overlooked, when a Supreme Court decision is surprising, it is
attributed to a lack of allegiance to a political party or abandonment of
a mode of interpretation.63  Instead, critics should remember that Jus-
tices are people with unique experiences that have shaped their
worldviews.
Justice O’Connor’s impact on gender discrimination cases became
apparent upon her arrival at the Court, beginning with her majority
opinion in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,64 finding certain
types of single-sex admissions policies violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause.  Based on precedent, this is a decision
that Justice O’Connor’s predecessor, Potter Stewart, would probably
not have cast.65  Like the research on federal appellate judges suggests,
Justice O’Connor had a compelling impact on her colleagues.  After
Justice O’Connor joined the Court, Justice Rehnquist increased his sup-
port for gender discrimination claimants from twenty-five to fifty per-
cent.66  Similarly, Justice Burger increased his support from thirty-two
to fifty percent, Justice Stevens from fifty-seven to eighty-three percent,
58. Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, Magazine, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/magazine/12ginsburg-t.html.
59. Justice Rehnquist’s remark was made during oral argument (at 24:58) for Duren
v. Missouri, where Ruth Bader Ginsburg challenged a law making jury service for women
voluntary, arguing it sends a message that women’s service was unnecessary to important
government functions. DUREN V. MISSOURI, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-
1979/1978/1978_77_6067 (oral argument recording and transcript) (last visited Apr. 6,
2014).
60. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
61. Bazelon, supra note 58. R
62. Id.
63. For a recent example, see Stiehm, supra note 2. R
64. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
65. Karen O’Connor & Alixandra B. Yanus, Judging Alone: Reflections on the Impor-
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and Justice White from sixty-nine to ninety percent.67  Given the statisti-
cal effect on Justices of all political leanings, one can infer that a
female’s presence affects a colleague’s decision making even more so
than ideology.
In both the Supreme Court and lower courts, the statistical effect
of a female’s presence only holds true when dealing with gender dis-
crimination cases.  For instance, Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor
agreed in only fifty-two percent of the Court’s decisions during the
twelve years they spent together on the bench (1993–2005).68  At first
glance, this might indicate that ideology weighs more heavily than gen-
der or experience.  However, in certain cases, the Justices agreed more
frequently; they were united in ninety percent of gender discrimination
cases.69  This underscores the fact that a woman’s impact is not plainly
based on her sex or gender, but rather on the type of cases understood
based on personal experience.  Justice O’Connor’s decision to vote with
the majority in United States v. Morrison70 further exhibits this.  Despite
her “strong track record of ruling in favor of ‘women’s rights,’”71 she
voted against the civil damages provision of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA).  If gender alone matters then O’Connor should
have voted in favor of upholding the Act.  However, Justice O’Connor
was voting based on personal experience—an experience unrelated to
gender.  As a former assistant attorney general, state senator, and appel-
late judge for the State of Arizona,72 she is a strong advocate for feder-
alism.  In her view, informed by her experiences, the prohibition of
violence against women remains with the states under their police
power.73  Throughout her tenure, Justice O’Connor engaged in robust
judicial scrutiny of congressional authority.74  Given her experiences in
67. Id.
68. Id. at 444.
69. Id.  See also Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial
Appointment: A Re-Examination, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297, 308 (2010) (O’Connor voted
for plaintiffs in Title VII gender discrimination cases eighty-nine percent of the time;
Ginsburg voted for plaintiffs ninety-two percent of the time). But see Susan W. Johnson &
Donald R. Songer, Judge Gender and the Voting Behavior of Justices on Two North American
Supreme Courts, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 265, 270 (2009) (O’Connor and Ginsburg’s agreement in
gender discrimination cases did not translate to other areas.  In civil liberties, criminal,
and torts cases, O’Connor was more conservative than Ginsburg and the average male
justice, while she was slightly more liberal than her male colleagues in equality cases.
Ginsburg was more liberal than the average male in all four categories).
70. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (O’Connor joined the majority, thereby departing from
Ginsburg, who joined the dissent).
71. Wendy McElroy, Does Rape Violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?, INDEP.
INST. (Oct. 1, 2000), http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=12.
72. CQ Supreme Court Collection, Sandra Day O’Connor, http://www.cqpress.com/
context/SupremeCourt/oconnor_bio.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
73. Specifically, the majority held violence against women was not an interstate
activity nor economic in nature; therefore, it was out of the scope of the congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.
74. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding federal law regulating
guns near schools was not tied to commerce and interfered with states’ traditional police
power). See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (involving
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the Arizona state government, she favored state autonomy and
remained remarkably consistent in her jurisprudence, even when it
meant voting against VAWA.
“Diversity” therefore, is not constrained to uniqueness in a racial,
religious, or gender sense; socioeconomic upbringing and prior work
or personal experiences intersect to shape Justice O’Connor’s jurispru-
dence as a whole.  Intersectionality matters.  For this reason, it is impos-
sible to claim that any one factor solely determines decision making.  As
Justice Ginsburg has said,
Yes, women bring a different life experience to the table.  All of
our differences make the conference better.  That I’m a woman,
that’s part of it, that I’m Jewish, that’s part of it, that I grew up in
Brooklyn, N.Y., and I went to summer camp in the Adirondacks,
all these things are part of me.75
  There is no formula.  Varied experiences in the aggregate shape indi-
vidual decision making.  Some factors may be more or less prominent,
but which factors take precedence differs among judges and cases.
These experiential factors are ever present yet seldom vocalized.
Although traditional models of decision making—whether one is an
originalist or living constitutionalist—are often used to predict voting
behavior, these models sometimes give way to life experiences.  Gender
is only one factor that shapes a judge’s life experience and worldview.
B. Gender Discrimination Cases at the U.S. Supreme Court:
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
The experiences of Justice O’Connor greatly affected the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on gender discrimination.  Following her depar-
ture, the liberal/conservative split was unchanged, but Justice Ginsburg
became the lone female.  The resulting effect was noticeable, particu-
larly in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,76 where the Court found
against allegations of workplace discrimination in a five to four deci-
sion.77  Statistically, there was a ninety percent probability that Justices
O’Connor and Ginsburg would have ruled together in favor of the
plaintiffs.78  Justice Ginsburg’s disappointment in her male colleagues
was clear.  She has repeatedly commented that Justice O’Connor would
use of marijuana; Justice O’Connor focused on the distinction between commercial activi-
ties at the local and national level).
75. Bazelon, supra note 58. R
76. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).  In this time period the Court decided other cases that
factually involved gender discrimination.  See Crawford v. Metro. Gov. of Nashville, 555
U.S. 271 (2009) (holding that an anti-retaliation provision of Title VII protects employees
who merely cooperate with internal investigation rather than complain on their own);
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009) (discussing pregnancy discrimination and
the calculation of pension benefits).
77. The Justice O’Connor departure effect suggests there is no similar long term
socializing effect on male Supreme Court Justices as there had been at the courts of
appeal.
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have sided with her, shifting the Court’s ultimate decision to favor the
complainant.79
The petitioner, Lilly Ledbetter sued her employer, Goodyear Tire
under a disparate treatment theory of Title VII alleging it intentionally
discriminated against her on the basis of gender by paying her signifi-
cantly less than her male counterparts.  The Supreme Court held that
her claim was time-barred because she did not file suit within one hun-
dred eighty days from the first discriminatory paycheck, even though
she did not learn of the disparity until decades later, just before her
retirement. Ledbetter presented a scenario not unfamiliar to Justice
Ginsburg.  As a law student, she was the subject of ridicule by her male
classmates and professors—the environment at Harvard Law School was
“extremely hostile.”80  The law school’s dean asked the women of the
class “what it felt like to occupy places that could have gone to deserv-
ing men.”81  Yet, Justice Ginsburg excelled academically and graduated
at the top of her class.82  Despite a recommendation from the Dean of
Harvard Law School, Justice Felix Frankfurter declined to interview her
for a clerkship; he “just wasn’t ready to hire a woman.”83  Upon gradua-
tion, no law firm offered her a job84 so Justice Ginsburg worked in legal
academia and became involved with the American Civil Liberties
Union’s Women’s Rights Project,85 where she argued six landmark
cases on gender equality before the Supreme Court.86  Of those six
cases, Justice Ginsburg won five, paving the way for constitutional pro-
tections against gender discrimination.
Justice Ginsburg’s background as a feminist legal activist who
helped establish women’s legal rights gave her a unique understanding
of the realities of gender discrimination. Ledbetter is an example where
the law does not fit those realities.  Justice Ginsburg’s firsthand experi-
ence87 not only informed her decision making but also prepared her to
enlighten her colleagues.  For starters, Justice Ginsburg took the sym-
bolic step of announcing her dissent from the bench.88  Second, she
79. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-ruthginsburg_N.
htm; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Address at the National Constitution Center, Phila.,
Pa. (Sept. 6, 2013) (video available at https://vimeo.com/74230799).
80. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/justices/ruth_bader_ginsburg,
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Neil A. Lewis, Rejected as a Clerk, Chosen as a Justice: Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1993, at A1.  Dean Albert Sacks wrote the recommendation, while a prior
dean, Erwin Griswold, contributed to the hostility previously referenced. Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, supra note 80.
84. Times Topics: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2012), http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/ruth_bader_ginsburg/index.html.
85. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, supra note 80. R
86. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/ruth-
bader-ginsburg-9312041 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
87. In addition to her firsthand experience, Ginsburg’s work as a feminist legal
activist provided an in-depth understanding of this case and empathy for the plaintiff.
88. Ironically, the opinion announcement transcript of her dissent identifies her as
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drew upon personal experiences in reflecting, “Title VII was meant to
govern real world employment practices and that world is what the court
ignores today.”89  In highlighting those realities, she addressed the fact:
An employee like Ledbetter trying to succeed in a male domi-
nated workplace in a job filled only by men before she was hired,
understandably maybe [sic] anxious to avoid making waves.  Pay
discrimination that recurs and swells an [sic] impact is signifi-
cantly different from discrete adverse actions promptly communi-
cated and easy to identify as discriminatory.90
Instead, the majority’s holding would force plaintiffs, even before
the pattern of discrimination fully developed, to sue too soon to prevail,
“while cutting them off as time barred once the pay differential is large
enough to enable them to mount a winnable case.”91  “[T]hat situation
cannot be what Congress intended when Title VII outlawed discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in our
nation’s workplaces.”92
C. The Role of Experiential Factors in Cases Calling for a Subjective
Analysis: Safford Unified School District
An examination of cases lacking clear doctrinal authority, such as
those commanding analysis by applying a subjective standard, even fur-
ther demonstrates that the totality of an individual’s experiences, and
not merely gender, shapes judicial decision making.  The ability to draw
upon individualized experiences to inform decision-making requires
the ability to empathize with those most affected by the court’s deci-
sions.  This is especially so when dealing with subjective standards,
which necessarily require judges to place themselves in the shoes of the
litigant.  For example, in the right-to-privacy context, one must deter-
mine whether the litigant herself had an actual subjective expectation
of privacy.
In Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, the court decided
whether the strip search of a female middle-school student violated the
Fourth Amendment.  To do so, the Court first had to examine the
intrusiveness of the search, weigh the governmental interest, and deter-
mine whether the government adopted a reasonable means of address-
ing its concern.  Assessing the intrusiveness of the search required an
understanding of the student’s experience and how others in her place
would have felt.93  Similarly, to weigh the nature of the governmental
interest, the Court needed to put itself in the place of school adminis-
www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1074 (follow “Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company - Opinion Announcement” hyperlink; then follow “Full Transcript
Text” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 658 n.9 (2007) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).
92. LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, supra note 88. R
93. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (“[A] school
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trators.94  During oral argument, the Justices examined the difficult
choices facing an administrator who is confronted with a tip that a stu-
dent is engaging in conduct harmful to herself, others, or the school
environment.  The transcript reveals many of the Justices engaging in
empathetic dialogue to understand what is at stake in their decision
making.  For instance, Justice Ginsburg put herself in the shoes of
administrators and asked: “But an official could follow up to see
whether this child—whether there is a basis for what she said.  But
there were no questions asked at all.”95  Similarly, Justice Alito, in sug-
gesting a problem-solving approach of less invasive alternatives, said
“the school could keep records on its students . . . .”96  In disbelief,
Justice Scalia scoffed, “[Y]ou reasonably suspect the student has drugs.
You’ve searched everywhere else.  By God, the drugs must be in her
underpants.”97  And with backup from Justice Roberts, “You are saying
if you have reasonable suspicion that it’s in the underwear, you
shouldn’t even bother searching the pack or the pockets.  You should
go straight to the underwear.  That can’t be right.”98
Because this case was not met with a strong ideological split among
the Justices, an argument can be made that the outcome would have
remained the same regardless of the presence of a female on the
bench.  Nevertheless, the oral argument transcript provides insight into
the individual Justices’ contributions to the decision making process as
a whole.  For instance, Justice Ginsburg was the first to address the sub-
jective experience of Redding as a young girl.  Ginsburg empathized by
placing herself in the shoes of this student and asking, “What was the
reason for . . . putting her in that humiliating situation?”99  Justice Gins-
burg’s inquiry put her male colleagues on notice, prompting Justice
Breyer to add, “[H]ere she is embarrassed . . . [t]here seems no reason
for that” because the school could have her instead “[p]ut on [her]
gym clothes . . . she does that every day.  [There are] just such obvious
alternatives to having her be really naked.”100  Later, Justice Breyer
recalled, “[W]hen I was 8 or 10 or 12 years old, you know, we did take
our clothes off once a day, we changed for gym” and “in my experience,
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of
the student and the nature of the infraction.’”) (citation omitted).
94. Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV.
DE NOVO 133, 143 (2009).
95. Transcript of Oral Argument of Matthew W. Wright on Behalf of the Petitioners
at 6, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 at 370 (2009) (No. 08-479)
[hereinafter Transcript of Stafford Unified Oral Argument], available at http://www.oyez.
org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_08_479.
96. Id. Previously, Justice Alito stated, “When I have cases involving children, I
can’t help but think of my own children.  When I get a case about discrimination, I have
to think about people in my own family who suffered discrimination because of their
ethnic background or because of religion or because of gender, and I do take that into
account.”  Bandes, supra note 94, at 138 (quoting Meeting of the Senate Judiciary Subject: The R
Nomination of Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 24, 2006).
97. Transcript of Safford Unified Oral Argument, supra note 95, at 11. R
98. Id. at 12.
99. Id. at 8.
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too, people did sometimes stick things in [their] underwear.”101  The
importance of Ginsburg’s role is further shown when, in response to
Justice Breyer’s comment (undoubtedly reflecting upon his own exper-
iences as a young boy), Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the search at
issue in this case was no locker room suit-up.102  Rather, a thirteen-year-
old girl was “forced to strip to her underwear and shake out her bra and
underpants in front of school officials who suspected her of concealing
prescription ibuprofen.”103  Justice Ginsburg quickly redirected Justice
Breyer’s conception to the “traumatic effect that an adolescent girl
would experience when forced to strip down to her underclothes in
front of school administrators.”104
This demonstrates how Justice Ginsburg’s presence as the lone
female on the court prompted her male colleagues to think of any dif-
ferences between a thirteen-year-old girl and a thirteen-year-old boy in
terms of how humiliating it is to be seen undressed.105  While the male
Justices “first thought of their own reaction” reflecting on grade school
gym class and thinking, “You change your clothes in the gym, what’s the
big deal?”106 Justice Ginsburg was quick to cure any lack of understand-
ing by sharing her own experiences.
The Court’s resulting opinion similarly reflected the use of empa-
thy as a tool in the Justices’ decision making.  It reads:
Savana’s subjective expectation of privacy against such a search is
inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and
humiliating.  The reasonableness of her expectation (required by
the Fourth Amendment standard) is indicated by the consistent
experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose ado-
lescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the
exposure.107
Ultimately, this inquiry prompted the Court to find that “[t]he
meaning of such a search [for evidence of wrongdoing], and the degra-
dation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a
category . . . demanding its own specific suspicions.”108  In contrast,
Justice Thomas’s dissent avoids empathetic inquiry of the search sub-
ject, which leads to a harsh conclusion, focusing instead on the “deep
intrusion into the administration of public schools.”109  Under this
rule, “[b]ecause the school officials searched in a location where the
pills could have been hidden, the search was reasonable in scope”110
101. Id. at 25.
102. Bandes, supra note 94, at 144. R
103. Id.
104. O’Connor & Yanus, supra note 65, at 448. R
105. Bazelon, supra note 58. R
106. Id.
107. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009) (citation
omitted) (although the court found that the defendant’s conduct was unconstitutional, it
was entitled to qualified immunity from liability).
108. Id. at 377.
109. Id. at 382–83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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regardless of how violated the subject of the search might have felt.111
In light of Justice Thomas’s dissent in Safford Unified, in which no
empathetic inquiry entered into the subjective expectation of privacy
analysis, it is interesting to note that as a judicial nominee, Clarence
Thomas told the Senate Judiciary Committee that a justice should be
able to “walk in the shoes of the people who are affected by what the
Court does.”112  Today, Thomas is viewed as one of the court’s least
empathetic Justices.113  What changed?  Perhaps even this provides
another example where experience has informed legal reasoning.
IV. THE GENDER NEUTRAL ROLE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
Another way to think about the role of women judges is to com-
pare them to the non-gender-related role of the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court.  It is true that the Chief Justice, serving
both as a justice and in an administrative capacity, is motivated by his
need to lead the Court.  However, in so leading the Court, the Chief
Justice uses his discretion, informed by his own experiences.  There-
fore, although this role is in part based on administrative duties, it nev-
ertheless provides a useful comparison in demonstrating how
experiences impact judicial decision making regardless of gender.  The
Chief Justice, like any other Justice—whether male, female, liberal, con-
servative—views his or her “voice” as a unique contribution to the panel
in the same way each female Justice might similarly share her unique
experiences to inform others’ decision making.
The role of Chief Justice is untouched by gender variance; no
female has ever occupied the position.  Arguing that women judges
have a “woman’s voice” is as strange as saying that a male, desirous of
achieving unanimity or collegiality on the Court, speaks with a “man’s
voice.”  Instead, as the following demonstrates, each Chief Justice has
historically carried out his leadership role based on his own discretion
and influenced by his own experiences, much in the same way that a
woman judge, or any judge, votes based on experiential factors.
Many Chief Justices, as institutional leaders, have desired to inspire
collegiality, homogeneity, and legitimacy.  It allows the court to func-
tion.114  Chief Justices Taft and Marshall both placed great value on
producing unanimous opinions.  Marshall, for instance, wrote the opin-
ions of the Court himself, submitted his opinions to the other Justices
for consideration, and reconciled any disagreement so that it may be
111. See id. at 389 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Nothing in Justice Thomas’s dissent
indicates a search of a body cavity would be unreasonable, so long as pills could be hid-
den there.
112. Catherine Crowe, Videri Quam Esse: The Role of Empathy in Judicial Discourse, 34
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 122 (2010) (footnote omitted).
113. See generally Eric L. Muller, Where, But for the Grace of God, Goes He?  The Search for
Empathy in the Criminal Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 225 (1998).
114. Ginsburg, supra note 79 (“One of the hallmarks of the court is collegiality. You R
could not do the job that the Constitution gives to us if you didn’t, to use one of Justice
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“delivered as the opinion of all.”115  In the first four years of his tenure,
there were no dissents and only one separate concurring opinion.116
However, Thomas Jefferson attributed the Court’s level of agreement,
not to Marshall’s willingness to modify opinions to reach consensus, but
rather to the Chief’s overwhelming influence on the other Justices.117
While Marshall is credited as developing the grand court we know
today, Chief Justice Taft also deserves recognition for uniformity and
collegiality.  Eighty-four percent of the Taft Court’s opinions were
unanimous.118  Taft’s concern for certainty in the law was not only for
the need of people to plan their lives and business transactions around
it, but also for the legitimacy of the institution itself.119  These goals
likely came from his experiences while serving as the United States Pres-
ident and in his subsequent experience as co-chairman of the National
War Labor Board.  As one of the most prominent conservative lawyers
of the day, he was widely expected to be a pro-employer member of the
Board.120  Yet as Chief Justice, Taft applied his experiences counter to
his ideology, most notably in his dissent in Adkins v. Children’s Hospi-
tal,121 where—despite a track record of voting with the conservative Jus-
tices and developing a reputation as pro-employer—he sided against
business owners and argued in favor of minimum wage laws.
The Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist’s leadership, was one of
the most fractured and divisive Courts.122  When John Roberts took
over the reins in September of 2005, he declared that one of his main
goals was to bring a more “collegial atmosphere” to the Court.123  Spe-
cifically, he sought to add both “‘credibility and stability’ to the law by
115. O’CONNOR, supra note 8, at 116 (citing PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE
SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 21-22 (1969)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dis-
sent, Legal Scholarship and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1283
(2001)).  There is danger in taking this too far: “When methods of accommodation
failed, however, the Justices of the Taft Court were willing to sign on to unanimous opin-
ions that contained statements of the law with which they did not agree.  Correspondence
between the Justices shows that many of their votes were changed only under protest.” Id.
at 118–119.
119. Id. at 116.
120. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 119 (1998).
121. Id. (citing VALERIE JEAN CONNER, THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD: STABILITY,
SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND THE VOLUNTARY STATE IN WORLD WAR I at ch. 2 (1983); HENRY F.
PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: A BIOGRAPHY 915 (1939); FOSTER
RHEA DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA 226–27 (1949)). See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S.
525 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
122. David A. Yalof et al., Collegiality Among U.S. Supreme Court Justices? An Early
Assessment of the Roberts Court, 95 JUDICATURE, July–Aug. 2011, at 12–13.
123. Id. at 13. The Roberts Court is actually slightly less collegial than the Rehnquist
Court; twenty-two percent of constitutional-case opinions written during the first four
years of the Roberts Court contain non-collegial rhetoric, compared to fourteen percent
under the Rehnquist Court’s last four terms. Id. at 18.  More recently, Justice Samuel Alito
is said to have “pursed his lips, rolled his eyes to the ceiling, and shook his head ‘no,’” as
Justice Ginsburg read dissents in two cases; Alito’s gestures “brought gasps from more
than one person in the audience.”  Dana Milbank, Alito is on a Roll.  An Eye Roll, WASH.
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urging his new colleagues to find agreement in their opinions wherever
possible.”124  This is because unanimous opinions are more difficult to
overturn “while closely divided 5–4 decisions make it harder for the
public to respect the court as an impartial institution that transcends
partisan politics.”125  Chief Justice Roberts has been vocal in the past
about his desire to “place the bipartisan legitimacy of the Court above
his own ideological agenda.”126  By breaking away from the more
recent five to four ideologically-divided decisions, Chief Justice Rob-
erts—like the late Chief Justice John Marshall—would rally his associate
members into a unified entity thereby strengthening the institutional
legitimacy of the Court.  Chief Justice Roberts himself seemed to be
striving for legitimacy via unanimity by joining the majority ninety-three
percent of the time during the October 2011 term.127  Yet not all of his
colleagues have “signed on:” the Court’s unanimity rate has increased
only slightly during Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure.128
Following the Affordable Care Act (ACA) decision, Chief Justice
Roberts received much criticism as well as admiration for joining the
liberal justices.  Court observers speculated that the move was an
attempt to “shield nine justices from the political fallout sure to result
from overturning the [ACA]”129 or that it was an attempt to demon-
strate the Court’s legitimacy—that they merely apply the law to the
facts, sans politics.  One reporter declared,
“For bringing the Court back from the partisan abyss, Roberts
deserves praise not only from liberals but from all Americans who
ATLANTIC (June 24, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/jus-
tice-alitos-inexcusable-rudeness/277163/ (giving a firsthand account).
124. Yalof, supra note 122, at 13. R
125. Id. Even still, former Justice O’Conner has noted the virtues of dissenting
opinions:
There is value to dissent even if it does not eventually carry the day.  Dissenting
opinions can force the Justices in the majority to respond to criticisms, honing
the Court’s opinion . . . . Dissents also can serve to limit the holding of the
majority opinion . . . and to alert future litigants, and all those who must be
governed by the law, of the precise scope of the Court’s opinion.
Perhaps most important, the dissent plays a role in showing those members of
the public who disagree with the Court’s opinion that their views, while they did
not prevail, were at least understood and taken seriously.
O’CONNOR, supra note 8, at 121.
126. Jeffrey Rosen, Welcome to the Roberts Court: How the Chief Justice Used Obamacare to
Reveal His True Identity, NEW REPUBLIC (June 29, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/
104493/welcome-the-roberts-court-who-the-chief-justice-was-all-along#.
127. Frequency in the Majority, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2012), http://sblog.s3.
amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SB_frequency_OT11_final.pdf.
128. Yalof, supra note 122, at 13. R
129. Paul Campos, Did John Roberts Switch his Vote?, SALON (June 28, 2012), http://
www.salon.com/2012/06/28/did_john_roberts_switch_his_vote/.  Some point to “warn-
ings” made by the Obama administration.  President Obama stated he was “confident that
the Supreme Court [would] not take what would be an unprecedented, extraordinary
step of overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a democratically elected
Congress.” Id.; see also Adam Aigner-Treworgy, President Obama: Overturning Individual
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believe that it’s important for the Court to stand for something
larger than politics. . . . He placed the bipartisan legitimacy of the
Court above his own ideological agenda.  Seven years into his
Chief Justiceship, the Supreme Court finally became the Roberts
Court.”130
Chief Justice Roberts exercised “political genius” by acting in a per-
ceivably bipartisan manner, upholding the liberal-backed ACA while
laying the groundwork for restricting congressional power in the
future.131  Chief Justice Roberts followed Chief Justice Marshall’s
lead,132 acting by not simply acting as a “conservative” appointee.  In
this light, Chief Justice Roberts’s vote was not as surprising as it first
appeared.  The lesson is that political ideology will not always “carry the
day” as the most reliant predictor of decision making.  While
“[j]urisprudentially, [Justice Roberts] is a constitutional conservative[,]
[i]nstitutionally, he is chief justice [sic] and sees himself as uniquely
entrusted with the custodianship of the Court’s legitimacy, reputation,
and stature.”133  For this reason, judicial decision making will never be
predictable under all circumstances.  Speculatively, if Chief Justice Rob-
erts were one of the Associate Justices, appointed by a Republican presi-
dent and having a history of conservative constitutional construction,
he may have voted to join the other conservative Justices.  Nevertheless,
Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure demonstrates the multifaceted role.  Just
as no two women are alike, neither are two Chief Justices.
V. OTHER EXPERIENTIAL FACTORS
Scholars of social background theory argue “the actions of judges
can be best understood as a product of their demographic characteris-
tics and personal and professional experiences such that a shared attri-
bute,” including prior work experience, “would affect subsequent
behavior in predictable ways.”134  Under this theory, a Justice who grew
up in socioeconomically disadvantaged circumstances might better
understand the plight of the poor in the same way a woman would
130. Rosen, supra note 126. R
131. Relatedly, Chief Justice Roberts’s vote on the healthcare ruling was seen as an
attempt to “protect the authority of his court against charges of partisanship while accru-
ing a mountain of political capital in the process.”  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Faces Cru-
cial Cases in New Session, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/
30/us/supreme-court-faces-crucial-cases-in-new-session.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0&smid=
fb-share&pagewanted=all (title subsequently changed to Supreme Court Faces Weighty Cases
and a New Dynamic).
132. See Rosen, supra note 126 (explaining Marshall’s similar act of “judicial jujitsu” R
in Marbury v. Madison, where he “refused to confront president Jefferson over a question
of executive privilege but laid the groundwork for expanding judicial power in the
future”).
133. Charles Krauthammer, Why Roberts Did It, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 28, 2012),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/304332/why-roberts-did-it-charles-
krauthammer#.
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understand gender discrimination.135  Therefore, by extension, many
different experiential factors similarly affect judicial decision making.
While it is too early to know the impact Justice Sonia Sotomayor
will have on the bench, she has expressed a desire to use her unique
experiences to complement her colleagues’ world-views.136  Aside from
“traditional” diversity factors, Justice Sotomayor has had a particularly
diverse experience prior to her tenure on the bench.  After law school,
she worked in the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office and later at a
top law firm before being appointed to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York and later to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.137  It is likely Justice Sotomayor will take these experiential fac-
tors into account in the same way that other women have considered
their own experiences of gender discrimination and that past chief jus-
tices, as institutional leaders, have drawn upon their own experiences in
organizing the goals of the court.
Religion may also inform judicial decision making.  Justice Scalia
has stated, “The laws I apply have a fair meaning, and that meaning is
no different for a Catholic than it is for a Jew, any more than it is differ-
ent for a woman and a man, or a white man and a black.”138  Yet he has
also stated that while his judicial decisions are not based on religion, he
would not work for a judicial system that was counter to the tenets of
Catholicism.139  Some well known Supreme Court Justices were, and
are, deeply religious.  Unlike the past, today’s Supreme Court Justices
have spoken publicly about their religious faith, at times explicitly stat-
ing in their opinions that “ ‘[c]ourts must recognize that the state is but
135. But at least one judge argued such a judge does not exist.  See United States v.
Pineda-Moreno, 617 F. 3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (J. Kozinski, dissenting):
[T]here’s one kind of diversity that doesn’t exist: No truly poor people are
appointed as federal judges, or as state judges for that matter.  Judges, regardless
of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from the class of people who don’t live in
trailers or urban ghettos.  The everyday problems of people who live in poverty
are not close to our hearts and minds because that’s not how we and our friends
live.
Thus, when impossible to draw upon one’s own life experiences, the role of empathy is
bolstered. See generally infra, Part VI.  Judge Kozinski demonstrates this beautifully: “The
panel’s breezy opinion is troubling on a number of grounds, not least among them its
unselfconscious cultural elitism.” Id.
136. Prior to her nomination, Justice Sotomayor once gave a speech declaring,
“‘Whether born from experience or inherent physiological or cultural differences,’ . . .
for jurists who are women and nonwhite, ‘our gender and national origins may and will
make a difference in our judging.’”  She added, “I would hope that a wise Latina woman
with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion
than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”  Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on
the Record, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A21.
137. Crowe, supra note 112, at 121. R
138. Kathleen Ganster, Scalia: Catholicism at Core of My Judicial Ethics, NEWSMAX
(Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.newsmax.com/InsideCover/scalia-catholicism-justice-
court/2011/09/25/id/412199.
139. Id.  See also John Garvey & Amy Coney Barrett, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases,
81 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1998) (arguing that while mere identification of a judge as Catho-
lic is not sufficient reason for recusal under federal law, the moral impossibility of enforc-
ing capital punishment in such cases as sentencing, enforcing jury recommendations, and
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one of several spheres of government, each with its distinct jurisdiction
and limited authority granted by God,’ and ‘that God, not the state or
any government established by man, is the source of all our rights.’”140
Although religion is a set of personal principles or beliefs, it too can
shape personal experiences.
Others have similarly argued that racial diversity on the bench is
important, not only on the basis that minority judges cause the public
to become more trustworthy and view the institution as more legitimate
but also on the grounds that the “interplay of diverse views and perspec-
tives can enrich judicial decision-making” by bringing important and
traditionally excluded perspectives to the bench.  Therefore, “minority
judges can play a key role in giving legitimacy to the narratives and
values of racial minorities.”141  Moreover, “racial diversity . . . [may]
encourage[ ] judicial impartiality[ ] by ensuring that a single set of val-
ues or views [does] not dominate judicial decision-making.”142  This
highlights the importance of intersectionality—life experiences which
are not wholly determined, but are certainly shaped, by individual
social identity.  For instance in Virginia v. Black,143 a case involving a
First Amendment challenge to a Virginia law prohibiting cross-burning,
a usually silent Justice Clarence Thomas—who grew up in the segre-
gated South144—became frustrated with his colleagues’ misunderstand-
ing of the meaning of cross-burning.  During an argument in favor of
the law, he noted that crosses were a “symbol of [a] reign of terror”
during the “100 years of lynching . . . in the South” and interjected:
“Aren’t you understanding . . . the effects of . . . the burning cross?”145
The impact of Justice Thomas’ remarks is not entirely clear.  Although
the Court ultimately struck down Virginia’s cross-burning ban, the
majority acknowledged that a “state, consistent with the First Amend-
ment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate,”
finding a new area of constitutionally unprotected speech for such
“true threats” of “intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bod-
ily harm.”146
140. Sanja Zgonjanin, Quoting the Bible: The Use of Religious References in Judi-
cial Decision-Making, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 31, 32–33 (2005) (citing Ex parte G.C., No.
1040001, 2005 WL 1793345, at *22 (Ala. July 29, 2005) (Parker, J., dissenting)).
141. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Con-
fidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 410 (2000).
142. Id. at 411.
143. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
144. Justice Clarence Thomas is the Court’s only African American Justice and its
only Southerner.  In his memoir, he reflected on his experiences growing up in Savan-
nah, GA. See generally CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR (2007).
145. Transcript of Oral Argument of Michael R. Dreeben at 22–23, Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No. 01-1107), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/01-1107.pdf. For a more entertaining account, see
Dahlia Lithwick, Virginia Burning: Are Cross-Burnings Speech or Violence?, SLATE (Dec. 11,
2002), http://www.slate.com/id/2075301/.
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VI. THE BROADER MORAL, ETHICAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF A DIVERSE JUDICIARY
President Carter was driven to appoint more women to the federal
judiciary by his deep commitment to human and civil rights as well as
his view that the judiciary should be representative of the American
“population, not of the lawyer population . . . .”147  Carter’s commit-
ment to women’s equality was shaped by the women around him,
including his wife, mother, and his administration officials who were
women.148  In light of this, “[h]e was committed to women’s equality of
opportunity as a substantive matter and believed that women’s presence
on the bench would promote greater public trust and confidence in the
judiciary as a symbolic matter.”149
President Obama has similarly declared:
We need somebody who’s got the heart, the empathy, to recog-
nize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom.  The empathy to
understand what it’s like to be poor, or African-American, or gay,
or disabled, or old.  And that’s the criteria by which I’ll be select-
ing my judges.150
In making his first appointment to the United States Supreme
Court, he sought a nominee with “[e]xperience . . . tested by obstacles
and barriers, by hardship and misfortune” because “[i]t is experience
that can give a person a common touch and a sense of compassion; an
understanding of how the world works and how ordinary people
live.”151  He found such experience in Sonia Sotomayor who, in
response, agreed:
This wealth of experiences, personal and professional, have
helped me appreciate the variety of perspectives that present
themselves in every case that I hear.  It has helped me to under-
stand, respect, and respond to the concerns and arguments of all
litigants who appear before me, as well as to the views of my col-
leagues on the bench.  I strive never to forget the real-world conse-
quences of my decisions on individuals, businesses, and
government.152
  Such statements have the potential to instill public confidence in the
judiciary, but they must be more than just political rhetoric.  As dis-
cussed throughout, experiential factors affect decision making.  In
many instances it even changes the outcomes of cases.  This has a
profound impact on everyone subjected to the law.  Therefore, as a
matter of public policy, experience matters.
147. Clark, supra note 34, at 1148 (emphasis added). R
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1149.
150. Crowe, supra note 112, at 122 (footnote omitted). R
151. Remarks by the President in Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States
Supreme Court, WHITE HOUSE (May 26, 2009, 10:13 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Nominating-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-
United-States-Supreme-Court/.
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Some legal commentators view “judicial empathy as necessary to
reach moral, reasoned decisions.”153  Justice Sotomayor has argued that
“by ignoring our differences as women or men of color we do a disser-
vice both to the law and society.”154  But others contend, “the capacity
of judges for empathy is irrelevant to their qualifications as judges and
ability to formulate sound legal opinions.”155  Thus, empathy has no
place in sound decision making because it renders the law less predict-
able.156  A purported middle approach is that empathy’s place in our
legal system should be confined to “legislators, public policy lobbyists,
attorneys, and juries.”157
Why permit juries to exercise empathy when acting as trier-of-fact
but disallow judges to do the same when serving the same function?
Those who argue empathy has no place in decision making point to the
fact judges must disqualify themselves “‘in any proceeding in which
their impartiality might reasonably be questioned,’ including ‘where
they have a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.’”158  But this
misconstrues and over-exaggerates the role of empathy.  Empathy is dis-
tinct from personal bias.  Personal bias would indicate favoritism to one
position over another.  Nor is empathy (a capacity) the same as sympa-
thy or compassion (emotions).  “Empathy entails understanding
another person’s perspective”; “sympathy is a feeling for or with the
object of the emotion.”159  Empathy, however, may be effectively used
to place oneself in the shoes of both sides of an argument.  A judge uses
empathy as just one of many tools toward understanding conflicting
claims.  “Empathy assists the judge in understanding the litigants’ per-
spectives . . . it does not help resolve the legal issue of which litigant
ought to prevail.”160  Prospective jurors are of course questioned about
153. Crowe, supra note 112, at 124. R
154. Nancy Maveety, Difference in Judicial Discourse, 6 POL. & GENDER 452, 454 (2010)
(quoting Justice Sonia Sotomayor).
155. Crowe, supra note 112, at 122. R
156. Judges who admonish empathy as a mode of judicial reasoning often dismiss it
on grounds that it disrupts formalistic rules, the separation of powers doctrine, stare deci-
sis, fidelity to law, or mere mechanical application of rules. See Lynne N. Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1587–90 (1987).
157. Crowe, supra note 112, at 124. R
158. Id. at 125 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a), (b)(1) (2006)). But the lines of this
admonition are uncertain.  Most recently, anti-gay activists have called for the recusal of
judges deciding cases involving same-sex marriage. See Zack Ford, Anti-Gay Extremists Call
for Illinois Judge to Recuse Herself Because She’s Gay, THINK PROGRESS (July 24, 2012), http://
thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2012/07/24/573541/anti-gay-extremists-call-for-illinois-judge-to-
recuse-herself-because-shes-gay/ (discussing Judge Hall’s involvement in hearing a chal-
lenge to Illinois’ ban on same-sex marriage while a member of the Alliance of Illinois
Judges, a group committed to “promoting and encourage[ing] respect and unbiased
treatment for LGBT individuals as they relate to the judiciary, the legal profession, and
the administration of justice”); see also Dan Levine, Gay Judge Never Thought to Drop Mar-
riage Case, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/06/us-
gaymarriage-judge-idUSTRE7356TA20110406) (discussing U.S. Judge Vaughn Walker’s
involvement as a homosexual in the California gay marriage ban commonly known as
Proposition 8).
159. Bandes, supra note 94, at 136 (footnote omitted). R
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possible personal bias and ability to return a verdict found “solely upon
the evidence and instructions of the court.”161  Yet they are not
instructed to remain completely narcissistic, sterile, or cold.  If empa-
thy, based on personal experience, is equated with “personal bias or
prejudice” then would it follow that Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg,
having experienced firsthand discrimination throughout their own
legal careers,162 should have recused themselves? Certainly not.
Those who advocate for total ignorance of one’s life experiences
and common sense wisdom in place of strict, machine-like adherence
to the rule of law fail to understand that it is not always possible to
interpret every issue with complete certainty, even to a cold, sterile
result.163  In Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding,164 as previously
discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a
thirteen-year-old female subject of a strip search subjectively felt that
the search was intrusive.  The answers to such a legal question will never
be plainly given by simply looking to the rule of law.  This is precisely
why judges often turn to legislative intent to determine the purpose of
enacting any given law.  In defining the purpose, one must typically ask:
what was this law meant to protect?  What kinds of situations were con-
templated?  The search for the purpose of the law can become clearer
by empathizing with the exact situation the law was intended to address.
It is wrong to assert that upholding the rule of law and empathy are
mutually exclusive.
Conversely, if such strict adherence to even the most unambiguous
laws were always possible, what should we make of the decisions whose
dissents later carried the day?  Are we to allow Dred Scott to live on until
the legislature, subject to the whims of the public, garners the courage
to rectify immorality?  Empathy is “an essential capacity for living in the
social world, and a basic component of moral reasoning . . . .  A total
lack of empathy, coupled with an equally total lack of remorse, is the
main defect of psychopaths.”165  The law aims to channel and influence
human behavior.  Thus, “[t]o apply the law, judges must constantly seek
to understand and predict motivations, intentions, perceptions, and
other aspects of human conduct”—it is empathy that makes that under-
standing possible.166  This is achievable only with empathy, aided by
161. Crowe, supra note 112, at 129 (footnote omitted). R
162. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, supra 80 (noting that Justice Ginsburg was faced with
an “extremely hostile” environment at Harvard due to her gender); Sandra Day O’Connor,
OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/justices/sandra_day_oconnor (last visited Apr. 6, 2014)
(explaining that Justice O’Connor faced a difficult job market after graduating law from
Stanford because “[n]o law firm in California wanted to hire her and only one offered
her a position as a legal secretary”).
163. Judge Posner argues that “when faced with legal questions lacking determina-
tive answers, judges need to consult good judgment,” defined as “an elusive faculty best
understood as a compound of empathy, modesty, maturity, a sense of proportion, bal-
ance, a recognition of human limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of reality and com-
mon sense.”  Bandes, supra note 94, at 137 (footnote omitted). R
164. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
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one’s life experiences, and an allowance to put oneself in the position
of another.  This, rather than innate biological differences, is the pri-
mary reason why gender and other social characteristics matter in shap-
ing the decisions of individual judges and those of colleagues with
whom they interact.
In addition to the demonstrated effect of the presence of a female
judge on an appellate panel, the representation of diverse women
judges influences public policy favorably—particularly to women.  This
is important for socialization and collegiality.167  Notable exclusion of
women judges sends a signal to young women about their career aspira-
tions and may keep many qualified women lawyers from seeking judge-
ships.  But when women are fairly represented on the federal bench,
the courts will better reflect the diverse population of this nation and
both women and men may have more confidence that the court under-
stands the real-world implications of its rulings.168  Increased presence
of women on the bench improves the quality of justice: women judges
can bring an understanding of the impact of the law on the lives of
women and girls by enriching courts’ understanding of how best to
realize the intended purpose and effect of the law.  Justice Ginsburg has
stated that if there were more women on the bench, some of the dis-
crimination cases might turn out differently “because the women will
relate to their own experiences.”169  But even presently serving “token”
judges may realize more hostility as minorities; logically, one may be
less likely to be vocal in a hostile environment.170  For example, Justice
Ginsburg reported that the quality of her treatment on the Court and
her comfort in dealing with colleagues decreased after Justice
O’Connor’s departure.171  Ginsburg further believes that “the presence
of women on the bench made it possible for the courts to appreciate
earlier than they might otherwise that sexual harassment belongs under
Title VII [as a violation of civil rights law].”172 Historically it has been
women attorneys and judges who have brought sex discrimination onto
the legal and political agenda.173  But this is just one example of the
larger picture: because life experience aids in the ability to achieve
sound judicial decision making, greater diversity must be more than
just aspirational.
CONCLUSION
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theo-
ries, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have had a
167. O’Connor & Yanus, supra note 65, at 441. R
168. Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go, supra note 15. R
169. See Bandes, supra note 94, at 137. R
170. See generally supra note 22. R
171. O’Connor & Yanus, supra note 65, at 448. R
172. Bazelon, supra note 58. R
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good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.174
It is important to recognize that no two women will decide a case in
precisely the same way.175  Nor would the same be true for any two men
or any two members of any race, religion, or sexual orientation.  How-
ever, when deciding a case that involves a form of discrimination that
only a certain class of discriminatees can experience, those life exper-
iences will impact judicial decision making.  The premise is not that
women or minorities have a different “voice” on the court.  Rather,
there is a natural tendency to relate to individualized experiences.
Although Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has restated the old adage, “a
wise old man and wise old woman will reach the same conclusion” in
deciding cases, she clarifies it is “helpful to the Court to have nine
members of different backgrounds and experiences and, yes, even gen-
der.  We bring different life experiences to the task, and that’s a good
thing.”176  Specifically in cases involving gender discrimination, out-
comes differ depending on whether there is a female on the court who
has experienced, whether directly or indirectly, similar discrimination
to that which is involved in the case at hand.
No one is just a woman or just a man.  Each person has diverse
experiences and each will bring to the bench experiences that affect
their own view of the law, life, and decision making.  All life experiences
affect and influence judicial decision making.177  It is human nature for
“personal experiences [to] affect the facts that judges choose to see.”178
When we appreciate the experiences that are commonly shared by one
particular group, such as women, we are able to see the broader impli-
cations of experience on any judge.  In the future we should refocus
our treatment of gender in the role of decision making.  Rather than
compartmentalizing the role of women on the bench, we should look
broadly to the experiences of each Justice.  It is true that gender dis-
crimination is just one experience that is felt, whether firsthand or
secondhand, commonly by women.  Because gender, and other social
characteristics, shape judges’ life experiences, it is important to have
diverse experiences on the bench.  While both women and men are
capable of understanding the issues at stake, the court as a whole is
better served when its individual judges bring diverse experiences to
the bench.
174. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881), available at http://
www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=3198728&pageno=2).
175. In the same way that “competing ideas about what it means to ‘represent
women’ make it difficult to define the substantive political representation of women,
especially when such differences are found among political representatives themselves”.
BENNION, supra note 5, at 10 (emphasis added). R
176. Maveety, supra note 154, at 455–56 (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor). R
177. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 489, 492–94 (1984).
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